The decision to create a subunified command for the cyberspace domain was made at the Office of the Secretary of Defense OSD level. But the decision to create a subunified command was based on a number of factors, one of which is the nature of the current threat.
Statement of General Kevin P. I'm privileged to showcase this joint team's achievements, discuss our requirements, and highlight future national security challenges across our mission areas. We continue to strengthen and sharpen our focus on deterrence while at the same time preserving our freedom of action in space and cyberspace.
Before continuing, I must say that we appreciate your support, because legislative investments across our mission areas are essential to our providing global security for America. These objectives include defending our national interests in the broader Middle East and South Central Asia, considering ways and means to improve the force's health, and balancing global strategic risks through deterrence.
We are now helping to translate these reports into the strategy and plans that our components and the joint force need. This year we will continue to focus on further developing our workforce, sustaining the highest possible standards in the nuclear enterprise, and integrating our global capabilities to support national and theater objectives.
These efforts will require investing in the deterrent enterprise, identifying mechanisms to better integrate operations, plans, requirements, and activities among our components, standing up U.
We have initiated and sustained several successful engagement efforts.
These dialogues are important and must continue. Over the past year, we welcomed the stand-up of Air Force Global Strike Command and our components' increased focus on the deterrence mission.
It demonstrated the full range of nuclear deterrence capabilities by integrating submarine strategic deterrent patrols, more than 90 aircraft sorties, an ICBM test launch, and five days of continuous airborne command-and-control operations.
Today's strategic mission requirements also demand the finest in command, control, and communications capabilities. Our s-era headquarters falls short of providing the capabilities we need. We appreciate Congressional support for the planning and design funds appropriated in Fiscal Years and and requested for These investments move us closer to a 21st century headquarters and command center for deterrence, space, and cyberspace operations.
This segregation detracts from natural synergies and ignores our experience in organizing to operate in the air, land, sea, and space domains. The Services are also reorganizing their cyber forces in order to present trained and equipped cyber operators to the Joint Force.
These forces will enhance our ability to operate and defend DoD information networks and provide the President with response options in cyberspace. More than 5, attendees, representing multiple commands, universities, industry, and at least ten other countries including His Excellency Sergey Kislyak, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the United States held substantive discussions on challenges facing our deterrence, space, and cyberspace professionals.
Our teams facilitated more effective employment of our capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ISRspace, operational security, electronic warfare EWand cyber. Moreover, state and non-state actors pursue traditional and asymmetric means to challenge the U.
With the exception of the U. Additionally, we find increasing threats to our freedom of action in the global commons of space and cyberspace, even as the importance of these domains to our national security continues to grow.
For example, Iran's successful February satellite launch and North Korea's attempt a few months later illustrate the spread of space launch technology. However, successful space-launch vehicles can also represent progress toward an effective intercontinental ballistic missile capability.
If perfected, such long-range ballistic missiles would place a larger area of the world at risk. Cyber networks weave through every facet of our lives and enable extraordinary communication, intelligence, and command and control capabilities.
However, an adversary acting in cyberspace can steal critical information, thwart vital data transmissions, or create devastating effects beyond the cyber domain. Governments, militaries, corporations, universities, and the individual computer user must guard against vulnerabilities that are open to criminals, organized hacktivists, state actors, and insider threats.
Addressing these challenges while capitalizing on the dramatic enabling capabilities of cyberspace requires an unwavering watchfulness, a dynamic defense-in-depth construct, a workforce that is carefully recruited, trained, and properly retained, strong partnerships, an infrastructure that supports global employment of DoD forces, and a realization that DoD's cyber culture, conduct, and capabilities must change.April 24, Incorporating Change 1, November 10, DA&MDCMO SUBJECT: Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), as the lead Combatant Commander (CCDR) for synchronizing DoD efforts to combat WMD in Security Initiative activities, consistent with Chairman of .
The DHS Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Terms (DAAT) list contains homeland security related acronyms, abbreviations, and terms that can be found in DHS documents, reports, and the FEMA Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Terms (FAAT) list.
Apps. ashio-midori.com-- includes section on social media apps. Social media apps make it easier to create and distribute content and discuss the things we care about and help us get the job done. After the war, the Continental Navy was dissolved. When the U.S. Constitution was implemented, the United States Navy and the Department of the Navy were formed to.
Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) is a concept that relates to the preparedness and response to serious incidents that involve the critical infrastructure of a region or nation..
The American Presidential directive PDD of May set up a national program of "Critical Infrastructure Protection". In the NIST Cybersecurity Framework was published after further presidential.
UNITED STATES CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY, POLICY, AND ORGANIZATION: POORLY POSTURED TO COPE WITH A USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command.
USCYBERCOM United States Cyber Command. xii ILLUSTRATIONS Page. Organizational Cyber Roles and US Code Authority .. 45 Table 5. National Strategy to Secure.